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WHY TAX WEALTH TRANSFERS?: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
JENNIFER BIRD-POLLAN* 
Abstract: The one-hundredth anniversary of the estate tax provides an ideal 
moment to reflect on the role of wealth transfer taxation in the larger scheme 
of the U.S. tax system. Wealth and income inequality are at historically high 
levels, and the responses to these issues are often reduced to a simplistic polit-
ical dichotomy of “right” versus “left.” The multitude of views of the Ameri-
can people cannot be reduced to such simple generalities without losing im-
portant nuances. This Article identifies three general categories of political 
philosophical viewpoints that are commonly endorsed by both politicians and 
everyday Americans, and then examines the current estate tax from within the 
perspective of those positions. The Article concludes that maintaining a 
wealth transfer tax system, perhaps organized as a tax assessed on the heirs, 
best matches the political views of twenty-first century Americans. 
INTRODUCTION 
Should we still, in 2016, upon the one-hundredth anniversary of the es-
tate tax in the United States, ask the question, “Why tax wealth transfers?” 
Is the answer merely one of political exigency? A leftover set of arguments 
from the early twentieth century? Or is there new evidence? Are there rea-
sons why, in 2016, scholars and elected officials should consider wealth 
transfer taxation as an essential part of any coherent tax policy? And fur-
ther, if this form of taxation is economically or philosophically important, is 
it also politically feasible? Are there reasons to think that the American pub-
lic would endorse a healthy estate tax, bringing the purview of the tax back 
to its pre-2001 levels, and strengthening it against aggressive tax planning 
strategies that threaten to eviscerate the tax base? And if such endorsement 
is possible, how best to present the tax? What arguments demonstrate the 
tax’s position in an ideal tax system, designed to enact the most commonly 
endorsed principles of fairness and justice? A glance at the current state of 
the U.S. federal wealth transfer tax system might lead one to conclude that, 
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even were it desirable, saving the estate tax might be impossible. This Arti-
cle, however, outlines reasons to believe that a more robust wealth transfer 
tax system, although not necessarily in the form it currently takes, is an es-
sential component of a comprehensive progressive tax system aimed at in-
creasing economic equality in this country. Further, this Article demon-
strates that wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most commonly held 
philosophical-political views, when those views are examined and their log-
ical consequences identified. 
Philosophy as a subject matter is most commonly relegated to the hal-
lowed halls and ivory towers of universities. An individual might dabble in 
Nietzsche or Plato as an eighteen-year-old, but most people leave philoso-
phy behind when choosing a career, a life plan, or moving on to the post-
college “real world.” This is unfortunate. Philosophy represents civiliza-
tion’s greatest tradition of thoughtful contemplation about life’s most im-
portant questions, including, among other things, how best to structure soci-
ety. One element of the structuring of society is the design of a tax system, 
and philosophy has, historically, had something to say about tax design.1  
But beyond specific recommendations regarding best practices in tax 
design, philosophy can help us think through the consequences of the par-
ticular philosophical views that individuals articulate. For instance, if an 
individual believes that property rights are fundamental and argues for the 
preeminence of property rights over all other elements of structural design 
in society, what consequence should that claim have on the tax system? Is 
such a belief consistent with social life? Should we interpret the claim in a 
way that makes it consistent with that individual’s lived experience? If the 
individual lives in society, benefitting from the advantages that come from 
that life, should we understand the claim of priority for property rights dif-
ferently than we would understand the claim if the individual chose to live 
                                                                                                                           
 1 There are numerous examples of philosophers discussing tax system design. These discus-
sions range from mere mentions of the issue, to robust discussions with particular suggestions. 
Among the many philosophers who have written about tax, Aristotle includes an extensive discus-
sion of taxation in his Politics. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
Batoche Books 1999) (350 B.C.) (discussing collection of taxes in the administration of different 
types of government). Plato’s Republic also includes a discussion of tax. PLATO, REPUBLIC 71 
(Chris Emlyn-Jones & William Preddy eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (380 B.C.). Im-
manuel Kant, in his Metaphysics of Morals, includes an explanation of his theory of tax. See gen-
erally KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1998) (1785). Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, in their respective works on property, 
include discussions of taxation in their theories of the state. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 127, 
143–44, 153–54 (1651), http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2MQ-YP4Y]; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16–30 
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1689). In more recent years, Robert Nozick and 
Milton Friedman have both articulated theories of taxation. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 172–76 (2002); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169–72, 265–68 
(1974). 
2016] Why Tax Wealth Transfers? 861 
off the grid, rejecting the benefits attributable to social life? In addition to 
understanding the consequences of particular claims, philosophical analysis 
allows us to identify what structural components might be endorsed by a 
variety of belief systems.  
This Article begins from this point, applying philosophical analysis to 
the question of wealth transfer taxation. It demonstrates that, despite the 
political opposition to the current U.S. federal estate tax, a robust wealth 
transfer tax system is, in fact, consistent with most philosophical views 
about property rights, social rights and obligations, social opportunity, and 
government responsibilities. At the center of this argument is the claim that 
political expressions of social will, especially to the extent they must be 
reduced to a preference for “Democrat” or “Republican,” do not accurately 
represent the complex of ideas addressed by the taxation of wealth transfers. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part I examines the current state of 
wealth transfer taxation in the United States, as well as the current political 
situation.2 Part II turns to economists and political commentators to explore 
what makes the current political situation different from earlier scenarios.3 
Part III addresses how wealth transfer taxation in particular can address the 
problems identified earlier in the Article.4 Part IV considers a variety of po-
litical philosophical perspectives, and how those perspectives approach the 
question of wealth transfer taxation.5 Finally, Part V identifies the particular 
structure of wealth transfer taxation best suited for that task.6 
I. CURRENT TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. federal estate tax was enacted in 1916.7 Its attendant compo-
nent parts, the federal gift tax and the federal generation-skipping transfer 
(“GST”) tax, followed closely behind, in 1924 and 1976 respectively.8 Orig-
inally adopted to raise revenues to support the war effort, while incidentally 
addressing wealth inequality in the United States, the wealth transfer tax 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See infra notes 7–30 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 31–40 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 44–91 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 7 Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME 
BULL. 118, 120–22 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/K68W-
TTSG] (discussing the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1916 which created the estate tax); David 
Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 1-1 (2013) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1579829 [https://perma.cc/RSE4-RL9S] 
(June 2013) (discussing the history of inheritance and estate taxes). 
 8 See Jacobson et al., supra note 7, at 120–22; Joulfaian, supra note 7, at 1-1. 
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system was originally relatively popular politically.9 In its hundred years of 
existence, it has evolved dramatically, and its popularity has waned. In par-
ticular, in the last fifteen years, largely in response to an anti-tax movement 
led by Grover Norquist, the founder and President of Americans for Tax 
Reform who has participated in the efforts to successfully identify the estate 
tax as the “death tax” in the minds of many Americans, the wealth transfer 
tax system has experienced declining popular and political support.10 
The current tax is imposed at what is effectively a flat rate of forty per-
cent on all wealth transfers over a lifetime in excess of the exemption 
amount—currently $5.45 million per individual (double that for married 
couples)—which rises annually with cost-of-living adjustments.11 These 
wealth transfers are in addition to the $14,000 per individual recipient per 
year that goes untaxed,12 and the payment of most educational and medical 
expenses on behalf of another person, which is also statutorily excluded 
from tax.13 The gift tax is integrated into the estate tax, as it is levied at the 
same rates, and transfers made as inter vivos gifts are counted against the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Early attempts to repeal the estate tax failed due to bipartisan support for the tax. For a dis-
cussion of such a repeal effort led by Andrew Mellon in the 1920s, see JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, 
THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 21 (2013); see also Louis Eisenstein, 
The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 226–38 (1955) (tracing the history 
and political support of and opposition to an estate tax); Joulfaian, supra note 7, at 1-1, 2-2 to 3 
(discussing the history of and reasons for implementing the estate tax in 1916 and noting growing 
opposition to estate taxes in the last decade). 
 10 The label “death tax” was first applied to the estate tax by Jim Martin, president of a sen-
iors’ association. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 13–14 (2005). Its popularization as a term for the tax, 
however, has been spearheaded by Norquist’s efforts. Id. at 29–31; see also Stephen Martin, 
America’s Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estate-tax/470403/ [https://perma.cc/UV6V-
D2VA] (comparing the general American preferences for equality of opportunity with general 
American opposition to the estate tax); Joseph Thorndike, Face It: Americans Just Don’t Like the 
Estate Tax, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2016/03/31/face-it-
americans-just-dont-like-the-estate-tax/#7afaa03f5bf4 [https://perma.cc/XL8V-2V4B] (citing a 
Gallup poll indicating 54% support for repeal of the estate tax). 
 11 The estate tax is imposed by the Internal Revenue Code § 2001. I.R.C. § 2001 (2012). The 
current rate of 40% is imposed on amounts in excess of the 2016 unified credit exemption equiva-
lent amount of $5,450,000. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 20.2010-2(5)(ii) (2015) (indi-
cating the 2016 exemption). 
 12 See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2012) (implementing a $10,000 exclusion adjusted for inflation). 
Section 2503(b) allows annual per-recipient transfers of $14,000 to fall outside of the statutory 
definition of “gift,” thereby allowing such transfers to have no impact on the lifetime exemption 
equivalent amount, and to fall outside of taxation entirely. See id. 
 13 I.R.C. § 2503(e). Section 2503(e) allows all transfers for direct payment of another’s medi-
cal or educational expenses to go untaxed. Id. In order to qualify for this exemption, the transfer 
must satisfy certain requirements, and the payments must be paid directly to the provider of the 
medical or educational services. Id. § 2503(e)(2). 
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lifetime exclusion amount.14 The GST tax is an additional tax assessed on 
transfers to heirs related to the transferor who are more than one generation 
removed from the transferor.15 This additional tax attempts to prevent large 
dynastic trusts from paying tax only every other generation by transferring 
to generations further removed from the transferor. 
The current state of the U.S. federal wealth transfer tax system repre-
sents a dramatic shift from the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 
2001, the lifetime exemption for wealth transfers was $675,000.16 Amounts 
transferred by inter vivos gift or post-death above that amount were then 
subject to tax at fifty-five percent.17 These higher levels of tax and lower 
exemption amount meant that the tax was imposed on more people.18 Alt-
hough the total dollar amounts were always a relatively small portion of 
total U.S. tax revenue, the importance of that kind of revenue should not be 
dismissed. In 2016 dollars, year-2000 levels of wealth transfer tax collec-
tions would have covered the costs of, for instance, all student aid funding 
administered through the federal government.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See I.R.C. § 2501 (2012) (imposing a gift tax). Section 2501 imposes an excise tax on the 
gratuitous transfer of wealth during the donor’s lifetime, if the transfer exceeds the lifetime unified 
credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,430,000. See id.; I.R.C. § 2505 (2012). The gift tax is 
statutorily linked to the estate tax, so the tax is imposed at the rate of 40% in 2015. I.R.C. 
§ 2502(a) (2012) (computing tax using the rates under § 2001). 
 15 I.R.C. § 2601 (2012). Section 2601 imposes a tax (in addition to taxes imposed under 
§ 2001 and § 2501) on direct transfers or distributions from a trust to a “skip person.” Id.; I.R.C. 
§§ 2611–2613 (2012). In addition to the unified credit against estate and gift taxes available under 
§ 2010, there is a lifetime credit against the GST tax equivalent to an exemption amount, in 2016, 
of $5,450,000. I.R.C. § 2631(c) (2012) (setting the GST exemption amount equal to the amount 
under § 2010). Transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent amount are taxed at 40% in 2016. 
I.R.C. §§ 2602, 2641 (2012). 
 16 I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000) (listing applicable exclusion amounts). $675,000 was itself an 
increase in the exemption amount as compared with earlier years, when lifetime transfers were 
only taxed if they exceeded a lower cap: $650,000 in 1999, $625,000 in 1998, progressing down 
to a $50,000 exemption amount when the tax was first enacted in 1916. JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYS-
TEM 5, 12 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744 [https://
perma.cc/YY4A-GZC8]. 
 17 I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2000). 
 18 In the year 2000, 2.16% of estates were subject to the estate tax, as opposed to a projection 
of only 0.2% of estates in 2015. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 16, at 25, 30. In addition, 
the estate tax system collected more total revenue in 2000 ($29 billion) than in 2015 (when it 
collected only an estimated $21.5 billion). Id. at 28, 30. 
 19 Converting 2001 dollars to 2015 dollars, the estate tax collected approximately $38.3 bil-
lion in 2001. Calculation of the effects of inflation on historical dollar amounts can be done with 
the inflation calculator produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. CPI Inflation Calculator, BU-
REAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/UET2-RY5V]. 
The cost of all federal student financial aid programs in the 2015 budget is under $31 billion. Al-
ternatively, the revenue raised from imposing the estate tax at 2001 levels could cover the costs of 
both the special education budget ($12.5 billion) and the funds for school districts with low-
income K–12 students ($15.6 billion) and there would still be some left over to cover part of the 
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This evolution of the taxation of wealth transfers in the United States 
tracks a political evolution that has created more and more opposition to 
taxation in general, and to the taxation of wealth transfers (referred to by 
leaders of this political movement as the “death tax”) in particular.20 As Mi-
chael Graetz and Ian Shapiro so insightfully demonstrated in their book on 
the subject, the estate tax was specifically targeted by anti-tax groups who 
effectively rallied seemingly disparate political groups to their cause in or-
der to create strong political pressure aimed at having the tax eliminated.21 
In the lead-up to a presidential election, prominent politicians on both 
sides of the aisle are asked to articulate a view about taxes. Their views of-
ten include a pronouncement about the role wealth transfer taxation should 
play. The 2016 presidential campaign cycle is no exception. Candidates for 
the Republican nomination included Jeb Bush, whose tax proposal con-
tained the following claim: “Death should not be taxable event. This reform 
[proposal] ends the estate and gift tax to protect family businesses and 
farms from an unfair tax.”22 Republican candidate Donald Trump previous-
ly supported a curtailed version of the estate tax.23 In 2011 Trump was a 
vocal proponent of lowering taxes, and his 2016 platform included a pro-
posal to eliminate the “death tax.” 24 Candidate Ben Carson’s tax plan also 
proposed eliminating the estate tax as part of a massive overhaul of the tax 
system in order to replace the progressive income tax with a flat tax.25 Can-
didates for the 2016 Democratic nomination also articulated their views 
about tax reform. Unsurprisingly, Democratic candidates tend to support the 
                                                                                                                           
costs of the federal response to natural disasters (estimated at $15.4 billion). See Interactive Budg-
et, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/interactive-budget. 
 20 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 4–5. “Estate tax repeal is one important strand 
of a looming effort to strip from our nation’s tax system the very idea that those who have more 
should shoulder a larger share of the tax burden.” Id. at 4. 
 21 Id. at 12–23. 
 22 Jeb Bush, Reform and Growth Plan, JEB 2016 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://jeb2016.com/
backgrounder-jeb-bushs-tax-reform-plan/ [https://perma.cc/W2R3-AUCS]. 
 23 DONALD TRUMP, THE AMERICA WE DESERVE 170–74 (2000). 
 24 Trump’s 2011 book, Time to Get Tough, articulates a “five-step plan [that] includes elimi-
nating the estate tax and the corporate income tax, lowering the tax rate on capital gains and divi-
dends, enacting a 20 percent tariff on all imported goods and creating a new, lower income tax 
rate structure,” according to the research institute Citizens for Tax Justice. Richard Phillips, Don-
ald Trump’s Regressive and Retrograde Tax Plan, TAX JUST. BLOG (June 22, 2015, 01:46 PM), 
http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2015/06/donald_trumps_regressive_and_r.php#.VwFqG6Q
rK [https://perma.cc/EZY4-KU84]. Trump’s 2016 campaign webpage includes the statement, “No 
family will have to pay the death tax. You earned and saved that money for your family, not the 
government. You paid taxes on it when you earned it.” Donald Trump, Tax Reform That Will 
Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE AM. GREAT AGAIN!, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/
positions/tax-reform [https://perma.cc/M8GD-VU6R]. 
 25 See Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of Dr. Ben Carson’s Tax Plan, TAX FOUND. 
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-dr-ben-carson-s-tax-plan [https://
perma.cc/7QM7-6VMF]. 
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taxation of wealth transfers, as consistently as their Republican counterparts 
tend to oppose it. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton focused her discus-
sion of tax reform primarily on changes in the taxation of capital gains,26 
however, she also endorsed returning estate and gift taxation to 2009 lev-
els.27 Candidate Bernie Sanders repeatedly expressed the view that taxes on 
wealthy individuals in the United States must be increased. As a U.S. Sena-
tor, Sanders proposed an estate tax reform bill that would have raised the 
highest rate of wealth transfer tax from 40% to 65%.28 Candidate Sanders 
has also proposed increasing the estate tax rate and decreasing the exemp-
tion level. 29 
Given the variety of political views espoused by candidates in the 2016 
presidential election, it seems likely that taxation in general, and wealth 
transfer taxation in particular, will remain a topic of debate through No-
vember 2016 and beyond. Despite the ongoing interest in the debate sur-
rounding wealth transfer taxation, and the number of vocal opponents will-
ing to fight against its continued existence, at least some commentators be-
lieve that the estate tax will never be completely eliminated from the tax 
code, for reasons of political exigency.30 
II. IS ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
EXCEPTIONAL? 
Thomas Piketty’s popular treatise Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
identified a variety of economic trends in the past 150 years that reflect 
changes in political organization, social will, and social and economic 
(in)equality.31 At the heart of Piketty’s argument is the claim that the distri-
bution of wealth in contemporary western democracies is more uneven than 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Alan Cole, The Details of Hillary Clinton’s Capital Gains Tax Proposal, TAX FOUND. (July 
28, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/details-hillary-clinton-s-capital-gains-tax-proposal [https://
perma.cc/Q5BE-9GC9]. 
 27 See Kyle Pomerleau & Michael Schuyler, Details and Analysis of Hilary Clinton’s Tax Pro-
posals, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-hillary-
clinton-s-tax-proposals [https://perma.cc/9HTT-VQLJ]. 
 28 Responsible Estate Tax Act, S. 1677, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). 
 29 See Alan Cole & Scott Greenberg, Details and Analysis of Senator Bernie Sanders’s Tax 
Plan, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-senator-
bernie-sanders-s-tax-plan [https://perma.cc/2QY6-GV9P]. 
 30 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 21 (2012) (arguing that Congress does not make any fundamental changes 
to the estate tax in order to allow individual members of Congress continue collecting campaign 
contributions from special interests). 
 31 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Gold-
hammer trans., 2014) (analyzing rates of return on capital compared to economic growth and pro-
posing a global progressive income tax to combat wealth concentration and income inequality). 
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at almost any point in the past century.32 Piketty uses tax return information, 
as well as references from popular fiction of the early twentieth century, to 
demonstrate that the levels of wealth inequality in the early years of the 
twenty-first century are extreme.33 Piketty goes on to argue that the conse-
quences of this wealth inequality are detrimental to society at large, and are 
inconsistent with most commonly expressed views about economic and so-
cial mobility, and about the importance of equality of opportunity as a foun-
dational principle in most western democracies.34 
Importantly, part of Piketty’s claim is not only that there is a dispropor-
tionate amount of wealth in the hands of certain individuals rather than oth-
ers, but also that the longer the inequality remains, the more problematic it 
becomes.35 Piketty’s economic claim is that previously accumulated wealth 
becomes disproportionately important over time.36 This is because most 
modern economies experience some period of economic stagnation. While 
returns to capital remain at least steady and incomes remain low, capital 
becomes more important. If returns to labor are limited, then the only way 
to improve one’s economic situation is to hold capital. Wage earners and 
those with little reserved capital cannot participate meaningfully in econom-
ic growth. The implication, then, is that inequality of income is a signifi-
cantly less important factor over time than inequality of wealth—especially 
inequality of accumulated wealth. And inequalities of wealth that survive 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. at 13–16, 237 (discussing changes in the distribution of wealth and inequality over 
time). Notably, Piketty is not claiming that things might have been worse before the twentieth 
century. Indeed, Piketty’s intuition seems to be that economic inequality might very well be worse 
now than it has ever been, but without empirical evidence to justify that claim, he limits his argu-
ments to the twentieth century and beyond. See id. at 11–16 (noting the lack of evidence available 
prior to the twentieth century). 
 33 See generally id. (comparing current and historical data to show changes in wealth ine-
quality). 
 34 See generally id. (arguing for a global tax on capital in recognition of the numerous and 
wide-reaching effects of wealth inequality). 
 35 Piketty’s observations about the exaggerated importance of inherited wealth are especially 
relevant to stagnating economies: 
When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the econ-
omy (as it did through much of history until the nineteenth century and as is likely to 
be the case again in the twenty-first century), then it logically follows that inherited 
wealth grows faster than output and income. People with inherited wealth need save 
only a portion of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly 
than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that in-
herited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a wide mar-
gin, and the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels—levels poten-
tially incompatible with the meritocratic values and principles of social justice fun-
damental to modern democratic societies. 
 Id. at 26. 
 36 Id. at 166. 
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over long periods of time are the most problematic inequalities. These ine-
qualities are exactly the inequalities addressed by the taxation of wealth 
transfers.37 
The evidence of inequality unearthed by Piketty is fundamentally re-
lated to a foundational principle of U.S. political identity. One typical re-
sponse to the claim that wealth transfers should be subject to tax is the ar-
gument that keeping such transfers free from tax ensures a free market 
meritocracy, in which individuals are financially rewarded for talent and 
hard work. The United States is regularly held up as an example of a true 
democracy—there are no inherited positions of authority, no dynastic 
wealth or family lands, and none of the trappings of aristocracy historically 
evident in European countries. America has historically prided itself on be-
ing the land of opportunity, where a mailroom errand boy can become the 
president of the company, pulling himself up by his bootstraps to achieve 
success. By tracing income and wealth quintiles over time, however, Piketty 
demonstrates that the current levels of wealth inequality in the United States 
and other western democracies are stagnant.38 That is to say, class mobility 
in the twenty-first century remains as difficult as it has always been.39 The 
concentration of wealth that has grown in the last hundred years has been 
passed down and further concentrated from one generation to the next. 
In addition to the concern that the further exacerbation of wealth ine-
quality makes the American dream of success despite starting from the bot-
tom more unlikely than ever, there is reason to believe that concentrations 
of wealth make democracy less viable. Commentators have repeatedly ob-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Much of Piketty’s book is dedicated to unpacking this relationship between capital and 
labor. In particular, see the chapter entitled “The Capital/Income Ratio Over the Long Run.” Id. at 
164–98. 
 38 Piketty spends a significant amount of time addressing the consequences of a stagnating 
economy on social and economic inequality, and lack of social mobility is yet another victim of 
lack of economic growth. As Piketty writes, 
When growth is zero or very low, the various economic and social functions as well 
as types of professional activity, are reproduced virtually without change from gen-
eration to generation. By contrast, constant growth, even if it is only 0.5 or 1 or 1.5 
percent per year, means that new functions are constantly being created and new 
skills are needed in every generation. Insofar as tastes and capabilities are only par-
tially transmitted from generation to generation (or are transmitted much less auto-
matically and mechanically than capital in land, real estate, or financial assets are 
transmitted by inheritance), growth can thus increase social mobility for individuals 
whose parents did not belong to the elite of the previous generation. 
Id. at 84–85. 
 39 With regard to class mobility in the United States, see generally Raj Chetty et al., Is the 
United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,844, Jan. 2014) (presenting evidence on trends 
in intergenerational mobility in the United States). 
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served that great wealth inequality is inconsistent with democratic ideals.40 
If this inverse relationship between inequality and democracy is true, then 
we must find a way to combat that inequality, in particular as it is transmit-
ted from one generation to the next, growing along the way. 
III. CAN WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION ADDRESS ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY? 
The form of taxation best situated to address problems of intergenera-
tional wealth inequality is the taxation of wealth transfers. Because wealth 
transfer taxation intercepts wealth at the moment it would otherwise be 
transmitted to the next generation, estate and gift (or inheritance) taxation 
can combat the concentration of wealth over time and the stagnation of op-
portunity over generations in a democracy. Unlike income and consumption 
taxes, or even direct wealth taxes (such as a real property tax), wealth trans-
fer taxation is specifically targeted at the transmission of wealth. The prob-
lems of inequality identified in the previous Part are primarily problems that 
arise over time, and income tax and direct taxes on wealth are taxes that are 
focused on one moment in time. That is, an income or wealth tax is assessed 
on the current earner of income, or holder of wealth, without regard to the 
ultimate disposition of that income or wealth, meaning that these forms of 
taxes are less well-suited to combatting problems of multi-generational 
wealth inequality. Of course, robust income and wealth taxes can reduce the 
concentration of wealth in individual taxpayers’ hands, and therefore, nec-
essarily, there would be less wealth remaining to be transferred to that tax-
payer’s heirs, either during lifetime or at death. These taxes, however, at 
least in their current forms, do nothing to combat the receipt of wealth 
through inheritance. And an income tax would have to include the imposi-
tion of tax at levels last seen in the 1960s to combat the concentration of 
wealth over time at the very highest income levels.41 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Discussing this issue, Robert Reich writes: 
As we’ve already seen in this Republican primary election, a handful of extraordi-
narily wealthy people can virtually control the election result—not entirely, but have 
a huge impact. That’s not a democracy. As the great American jurist and Supreme 
Court associate justice Louis Brandeis once said: “We can have huge wealth in the 
hands of a relatively few people or we can have a democracy. But we can’t have 
both.” 
Robert Reich, What Happened to the Moral Center of American Capitalism? ROBERTREICH.ORG 
(Sept. 4, 2015), http://robertreich.org/post/128336881225 [https://perma.cc/585X-GPC3]. 
 41 In 1960 the highest marginal income tax rate in the United States was 91%. TAX FOUND., 
FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY (2013), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/tax
foundation.org/files/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH3J-ZJCR]. 
In 2016 the highest income tax rate is 39.6% and that rate applies to all single taxpayers who earn 
over $413,200, or married couples with incomes over $464,850. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2015); Rev. 
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Direct taxation of wealth might help combat the inequalities identified 
in the previous Part, but this form of tax tends to find opposition along a 
variety of lines. Defenders of meritocracy claim that a second layer of tax, a 
wealth tax, imposed on amounts that were already subject to income tax 
when earned by that same taxpayer, penalizes success in an inexcusable 
way.42 Further, the consumption of wealth by high-earning individuals is 
not, as such, a problem along the lines identified in Part II. It is the concen-
tration of wealth and its exacerbated concentration over time that threatens 
democracy. Therefore, allowing a taxpayer to earn significant income, in-
vest it, produce additional income from that investment, and then consume 
it all within a lifetime, while potentially distasteful to some, does not threat-
en fundamental principles of equality of opportunity and democracy in the 
United States. In this way, a wealth tax might go too far by collecting tax 
from those who would otherwise mostly consume their wealth during their 
lifetimes, rather than attempting to transfer it to their heirs. 
While taxation in general suffers a lack of popularity in contemporary 
political discourse, there is good reason to believe that wealth transfer taxa-
tion, as opposed to the taxation of income or consumption, might be most 
palatable to people holding a wide variety of political and philosophical 
beliefs. As this author has demonstrated elsewhere through a series of arti-
cles on the relationship between philosophy and the taxation of wealth 
transfers, many different philosophical positions, which find themselves on 
different ends of the political spectrum, are consistent with, and often even 
endorse, wealth transfer taxes.43 
                                                                                                                           
Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860. This means that the highest tax rate is 39.6%, and a married 
couple earning $465,000 finds itself in the same marginal tax bracket as the married couple earn-
ing $100 million. This income tax system does nothing to combat high levels of wealth inequality, 
as it does not distinguish, for tax purposes, between the top 5% of income earners and the top 
0.1% of income earners, allowing the very richest American taxpayers to keep a very significant 
portion of their pre-tax unequal incomes. Of course, high-income taxpayers consume a smaller 
percentage of their post-tax income than do their lower income counterparts, thereby allowing 
them to then transfer larger amounts of that income to their children, creating intergenerational 
wealth. 
 42 STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 223–24 (3d 
ed. 2014) (“[E]state taxes and gift taxes . . . are aimed at nonmerit forms of wealth accumulation 
. . . . Those who oppose such [wealth] taxes often label them ‘confiscatory’ and argue that they 
discourage work, savings, and investment.”). 
 43 See generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertari-
anism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and 
Property] (examining estate taxes through the lens of libertarianism); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Un-
seating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. 
REV. 713 (2013) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege] (arguing that wealth taxes are 
consistent with Rawlsian equality of opportunity). 
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IV. DO CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS COMPORT WITH WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAXATION? 
Identifying coherent philosophical viewpoints in the miasma of the 
current political debate in the United States can seem like a daunting task. 
Approaching the problem from within the perspective of the philosophical 
tradition, however, gives structure to what might otherwise be a hopeless 
endeavor. One of the fundamental premises of tax design in a democracy is 
that the tax system should comply with a majority of the citizens’ ideas of 
fairness. Although this is an easily identifiable goal in theory, what that ac-
tually means in practice is incredibly complex. Economists, tax lawyers, 
drafters of legislation, and politicians are responsible for taking this politi-
cal will and applying it in the thousands of particular ways necessary to 
draft the tax law. Unfortunately, spending so much time in the proverbial 
weeds of tax policy often means leaving behind the bigger picture. At the 
same time, the loudest political voices often focus on one particular element 
of the tax law, most often seeking a particular outcome rather than consider-
ing that element in the context of a larger discussion of fairness overall.44 To 
that end, opposition to the current estate tax, while following the lines of the 
“death tax” campaign discussed above,45 often focuses on the tax as an “un-
fair double tax,” “punishing death,” or “punishing savings”—rather than 
thinking of the estate tax as part of a larger cohesive system aimed at 
achieving a particular democratically endorsed goal. This Part takes the re-
sponsibility of looking at the estate tax holistically and seriously, and con-
siders the major philosophical systems most commonly endorsed in con-
temporary society.46 
Philosophy does not have a unified response to taxation generally or 
wealth transfer taxation specifically. What philosophical inquiry can add to 
the discussion is an analysis of goals and strategies that help to determine 
which tax law best reflects the needs and beliefs of the society to which it 
applies. As a discipline with more than two thousand years of recorded his-
tory, there are obviously more philosophical perspectives than can fit into 
this Article. Contemporary political philosophy, however, arguably repre-
sents, at least generally, the philosophical beliefs and needs of most western 
societies. Therefore, this Part focuses on three of the most prevalent theo-
ries in contemporary political philosophy: liberalism, libertarianism, and 
                                                                                                                           
 44 This focus on a particular outcome is probably chosen as a political strategy because focus-
ing on a particular outcome makes for a more convincing political sound bite. 
 45 See supra notes 10, 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 46 These issues are considered in more detail in the author’s other works. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Bird-Pollan, Philosophical Foundations of Wealth Transfer Taxation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF TAX LAW (forthcoming 2016); Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 
43; Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43. 
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utilitarianism.47 As this Part demonstrates, examining wealth transfer taxa-
tion from the perspective of each of these theories results in the same cen-
tral conclusion: the taxation of wealth transfers is justified and is an essen-
tial element of any robust contemporary tax system.48 
A. Liberalism 
Political liberalism is perhaps the most prevalent theory in contempo-
rary political philosophy. Most completely articulated by John Rawls, liber-
alism generally endorses political systems that guarantee equality of oppor-
tunity, while not necessarily seeking equality of outcome.49 Commentators 
generally agree that Rawlsian liberalism is compatible with heavy redistri-
bution.50 In spite of this, much of the work using Rawls to analyze or justify 
tax policy has focused on the income tax.51 Although this work is useful in 
making arguments about the fundamental nature of philosophical arguments 
in justifying tax policy, the income tax alone is not capable of satisfying the 
goals of a Rawlsian equality of opportunity.52 Because of the vast opportu-
nities afforded to recipients of transferred wealth, the estate tax is the ap-
propriate tool to use in order to achieve true equality of opportunity.53 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Each of these theories is, in fact, composed of many different threads, representing a varie-
ty of interpretations of the central claims. Each section focuses primarily on one foundational 
articulation of the view: Rawlsian liberalism, Nozickian libertarianism, and Millian utilitarianism. 
 48 The analyses demonstrate the differences in the form of wealth transfer taxation most 
strongly endorsed by the particular philosophical theory in question. Although we clearly cannot 
conclude that one particular form of wealth transfer taxation is unanimously endorsed by all philo-
sophical views, this Article claims that most major philosophical political theories endorse wealth 
transfer taxation as such. This at least advances the conversation. If we debate what form the tax 
should take, rather than whether or not we should have such a tax at all, we have already made 
progress. 
 49 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 50 Most, if not all, tax law articles that make reference to Rawls do so in support of the propo-
sition that Rawls endorsed a redistributive liberal position. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Equal Oppor-
tunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 479, 485 (2007); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, 
Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (1981); Eric Rakowski, Taxing 
Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 446 (1996); Kerry Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer 
Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 252–56 (2010). 
 51 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 
157 (1999); O’Kelley, supra note 50; Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limita-
tions on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004). 
Notable exceptions include Alstott, supra note 50, and Ryan, supra note 50. 
 52 Linda Sugin argued that “[Rawls’s] analysis of philosophical principles does not require 
commitment to any particular tax system at all. Numerous tax systems could conceivably satisfy 
Rawls’s principles of justice.” Sugin, supra note 51, at 1998. Although this may be true with re-
gard to the particular mechanics of the tax system imposed, this Article argues that some kind of 
wealth transfer taxation is, in fact, required by Rawlsian principles of equality of opportunity. 
 53 In her article Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott notes the way in 
which wealth transfer taxes are especially well suited to achieve equality-of-opportunity goals 
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One of Rawls’s central arguments was the principle that, in contrast to 
the arguments of utilitarianism, there are central human liberties that cannot 
be violated in a just society, regardless of the overall good of society that 
might be attained by such a violation.54 The extension of Rawls’s thought in 
the form of so-called “luck egalitarianism” held that equality of opportunity 
within society must account not only for economic inequalities but also for 
the many individual characteristics (beauty, intelligence, family connec-
tions) that make up opportunities in contemporary society.55 Rawls’s prima-
ry concern was to explain how a society could be understood to be just and 
how its citizens could be seen to be equal.56 
                                                                                                                           
more broadly. Alstott, supra note 50, at 542 (“[E]qual opportunity . . . is widely understood to be 
the bedrock principle for wealth transfer taxation . . . .”). 
 54 Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722. 
The basic shortcoming of utilitarianism—in whatever form—is that basic rights of 
individuals can be sacrificed for a collective societal goal such as maximizing social 
welfare. It allows an unacceptable trade-off among persons: utilitarianism formu-
lates a principle which may require lesser life prospects for some, simply for the 
sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Utilitarianism does not rec-
ognize that everyone has equal moral worth (which, as we will see, for Rawls does 
not entail that distributive shares have to be equal), and therefore recognizes neither 
the way persons are equal to each other, nor the way they differ from each other. 
Id. at 722 n.42 (quoting PERCY B. LEHNING, JOHN RAWLS: AN INTRODUCTION 17–18 
(2009)). 
 55 Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722–23. 
Freedom of fair choice, fair equality of opportunity, and relative priority for the po-
sition of the least advantaged, are not only core elements of a (political) conception 
of justice, they are also characteristics of modern welfare states. Pointing to the im-
portance of freedom of choice means that, in actual social economic policies in wel-
fare states, more than has been the case in the past, a distinction is being made be-
tween the positions that people are in, and for which they themselves bear responsi-
bility, and the positions that they are in for which they are not to blame, positions 
that are a consequence of the “Rawlsian” “contingencies of social life,” so to speak. 
Freedom of choice, in this line of reasoning, goes together with stressing personal 
responsibility, provided that conditions are fulfilled such that people can actually 
take responsibility for their choices. 
Id. at 722 n.43 (quoting LEHNING, supra note 54, at 220–21). 
 56 Grappling with this issue Rawls stated: 
One can try to deal with this question [of freedom] by viewing political society in a 
certain way, namely, as a fair system of cooperation over time from one generation 
to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free and equal citi-
zens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete life. We then try 
to formulate principles of political justice such that if the basic structure of society—
the main political and social institutions and the way they fit together as one scheme 
of cooperation—satisfies those principles, then we can say without pretense and 
fakery that citizens are indeed free and equal. 
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 4 (2001). 
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Contemporary American society has significant economic inequality.57 
This in itself is not a violation of Rawls’ theory of equal opportunity be-
cause Rawls endorsed equality of opportunity rather than equality of posi-
tion or egalitarianism.58 If the inequalities present in society had been ar-
rived at only through differences in effort, then it is entirely possible that 
Rawls would accept the current distribution of wealth as just.59 Because 
equality-of-opportunity theorists accept that even with true equality of op-
portunity present, equality of condition does not necessarily result, Rawls 
need not critique current society as necessarily unjust.60 It is possible that 
with the same original opportunities, different members of society end up in 
different positions with regard to social and economic status. Equality of 
opportunity does not necessarily view as unjust the uneven distribution of 
talents or ability to exert effort.61 If that uneven distribution of talents and 
effort results in additional opportunities being made available to the chil-
dren of the talented, then that would violate the principles of Rawlsian 
equality of opportunity. It is not difficult to see that if wealth is allowed to 
pass unchecked down to future generations, the inequality present in the 
original, equal-opportunity state could grow exponentially. 
B. Libertarianism 
Another common strand in political philosophy is libertarianism. Lib-
ertarianism generally embraces freedom and liberty above other political 
goals, and evaluates political systems by their tendency towards the protec-
tion or infringement of individual freedoms.62 Early proponents of libertari-
anism include Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick, both of whom argued 
for limited taxation.63 In general, libertarian analyses of taxation endorse 
only taxation as payment for services—a version of the benefit principle of 
                                                                                                                           
 57 For evidence on social and economic mobility within the United States, see generally Dan-
iel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to 
2000 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2007) (demonstrating that social 
and economic mobility in the United States has decreased since 1980 after rising sharply between 
1940 and 1980). 
 58 See Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722–31 (discussing equality of 
opportunity versus equality of outcome). 
 59 Id. at 724. Rawls did not actually believe that a society following his two principles of 
justice would have great social and economic inequality. See id. at 729 & n.71 (discussing Rawls’s 
difference principle). 
 60 See id. at 730. 
 61 Proponents of equality of opportunity, however, might actually view the uneven distribu-
tion of talents as unfair. 
 62 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 1345, 1359–61 (2015) (providing an introduction to libertarian political theory). 
 63 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 172–75; NOZICK, supra note 1, at 169. 
874 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:859 
taxation.64 The central tenet of libertarianism is that the government cannot 
coerce action by its citizens.65 Only free consent to the law can result in just 
governance.66 
Strong property rights are another critical feature of libertarian think-
ing. Libertarians generally believe property rights are naturally held, rather 
than existing as a result of governmental grace.67 Because property rights 
pre-date social membership, the government cannot curtail or eliminate 
property rights, again with the exception of consent by the property holder. 
As a result, unsurprisingly, most taxation is seen as an unjust violation of 
property rights by the government. Wealth transfer taxation would be sub-
ject to the same libertarian criticisms as all other forms of taxation, namely 
that the tax is immoral unless it is explicitly consented to by the property 
holder. As this author has argued elsewhere, however, the estate tax pro-
vides a unique possibility for just taxation under the libertarian frame-
work.68 Because the entity subject to taxation (the estate) is not a person 
with natural rights, the normal libertarian arguments regarding unassailable 
property rights and the requirements of consent do not apply. 
Even those who hold a pure libertarian view of property rights, those 
who endorse an inviolable set of rights that cannot be breached without 
consent, concede that their view of property rights is consistent with limited 
taxation.69 Libertarians have disagreed about the level of consent required 
in order to legitimately tax property owners, ranging from Nozick, who 
seems to require explicit consent from every individual subject to the tax, to 
more pragmatic views, with proponents arguing that remaining within the 
society or accepting government-provided benefits are sufficient forms of 
                                                                                                                           
 64 The benefit theory of taxation has a long history, but depends on a number of assumptions 
related to the calculation of benefits and the imposition of tax. “If you think markets are inherently 
fairer or otherwise morally preferable to charity or government transfers that do not imitate market 
exchanges, it may occur to you that taxes should be designed to match tax burdens with the benefit 
of the social and merit goods provided by government.” STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN IN-
TRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 28 (1993). 
 65 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15 (“Political freedom means the absence of coercion . . . .”). 
 66 See id. 
 67 See David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical 
Review, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23, 24 (2005) (arguing against libertarian objections to taxation, 
after laying out the libertarian position). David Duff begins his article by identifying the Lockean 
background to the libertarian view of private property, and then goes on to say, “Although liber-
tarian theories begin with the state of nature, they also recognize that the liberty and property 
rights that exist in this state are insecure and best protected through some form of civil or political 
society.” Id. at 24–29. In other words, while property rights are not created by government, they 
are protected by government. 
 68 See Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 43. 
 69 See id.; Fleischer, supra note 62. 
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implicit consent to legitimate the tax.70 Regardless of these differences re-
garding the necessary form of consent, libertarians have generally agreed 
that taxation as payment for services received is a legitimate form of taxa-
tion by the government.71 This kind of tax, justified by the so-called benefit 
principle of taxation, views the government as a provider of services, col-
lecting payment for those services (in the form of taxes) as part of a market 
transaction.72 On this argument, citizens might argue that the government 
should limit the kinds of services it provides to those that only the govern-
ment could provide, or to services where there is a significant increase in 
the efficacy of the service or a lowering of its cost when provided by the 
government. The kinds of services for which the government could assess 
fees via the collection of taxes might include the maintenance of roads and 
sewers or the provision of security (both local and national).73 In a more 
expansive state, services might include public education, the regulation of 
markets, or the provision of public healthcare. While a classic libertarian 
might balk at the second set of services, the libertarian position merely re-
quires that the citizens receiving—and paying for, through taxes—the ser-
vices in question consent to have the government provide the services.74 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Nozick makes clear his views of implicit consent when he writes that, “[E]veryone else 
realizes that tacit consent isn’t worth the paper it’s not written on . . . .” NOZICK, supra note 1, at 
287. Earlier in the book he claims to have demonstrated that the reason a minimal state is not 
redistributive, when the amounts paid by some are used to pay for the protection of others, stems 
from the fact that those who are receiving protection without paying are getting that protection for 
free in compensation for the rights they may have given up. Id. at 114. Barbara Fried demon-
strates, however, that Nozick’s lack of a coherent theory of property rights and consent leads to 
the result that, in certain circumstances (such as the move from a minimal state to a slightly more 
than minimal state), consent to limit the rights of citizens does not have to be explicitly attained. 
Barbara Fried, Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO NOZICK’S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 235 (Ralph M. Bader & John Meadowcroft eds., 
2011). Fried claims that “in place of actual or implied consent, Nozick does away with consent 
entirely.” Id. 
 71 In Nozick’s explanation of the shift from anarchy to a minimal state he demonstrates the 
situation in which an individual could be compelled to pay for protection, because the individual is 
benefitting from the provision of that protection. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 110–18. 
 72 The benefit principle of taxation, authorizing taxation only to the extent that it compensates 
the government for services it provides to its taxpaying citizens, is not a view held only by liber-
tarians. For a discussion of the benefit principle of taxation, and an explanation of its ongoing role 
in tax policy debates, see JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 86 (4th ed. 2008).  
 73 Even Milton Friedman himself, in many ways the father of libertarianism, imagined that a 
government should provide certain services, and could therefore assess tax on its citizens in order 
to receive payment for those services. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 27–32. 
 74 There is a tradition known as left libertarianism, in which a more expansive state, such as 
one that might provide the second set of services listed above, is more likely to be endorsed. What 
left libertarianism shares with the tradition of right libertarianism is the insistence on the im-
portance of consent in providing moral legitimacy to the government and its curtailing of property 
rights. For examples of left libertarianism, see MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT 
INEQUALITY (2003); THE ORIGINS OF LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HISTORICAL 
WRITINGS (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000). 
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A payment-for-services benefit principle model of taxation seems to fit 
most naturally with an income tax, rather than an estate tax or other transfer 
tax. Because the services in question (such as maintenance of roads, nation-
al security, and garbage collection, for example) would be provided regular-
ly, an annual accounting of the cost of the services, and the amount of that 
cost allocable to any particular taxpayer, would be easier to administer than 
a lifetime calculation done via the estate tax. In addition to the ease of ad-
ministration, the income tax seems to fit the payment-for-services model 
better than the estate tax would because it charges the taxpayer for the ser-
vices in the general time period in which the services were received, rather 
than waiting until the end of the taxpayer’s life to calculate the amount 
due.75 A society could, however, elect to administer a payment-for-services 
type of tax as an estate tax. That structure would use the end of life as a 
time to calculate the benefits enjoyed over a lifetime, and would assess tax 
to compensate the government for the benefits it had provided to the de-
ceased. There are several reasons that this does not seem to be the ideal 
scenario, not least because if the taxpayer had no estate remaining at death 
there would be no way to recover payment for the services the government 
had provided.76 
For the reasons explained above, libertarians might approve of an in-
come tax if it were designed to satisfy the libertarian benefit principle re-
quirements. Unsurprisingly, however, a wealth transfer tax that was justified 
as a method of redistributing wealth from the richest taxpayers to the rest of 
society is anathema to the libertarian moral view.77 Because it would likely 
violate the principle of taking from the taxpayer only with (implicit or ex-
plicit) consent, government-facilitated redistribution through the tax code is 
immoral on the libertarian view.78 As such, there is not necessarily a fun-
                                                                                                                           
 75 In most payment-for-services scenarios, payment is made in the general timeframe in which 
the services are provided. Providing a lifetime of services and waiting for payment until the end of 
that lifetime seems to leave significant room for error. 
 76 Under the current system, individuals receive the benefits of government services, and then 
must pay an annual income tax. If an individual does not have sufficient funds available to pay the 
income tax that the government assesses against them, then the government has a variety of meth-
ods available to help it decide whether to forgive some amount of the assessed taxes, or collect 
from the individual in future years. For a discussion of the way the government makes these deci-
sions, see generally Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the 
Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (2012). If, however, a government held its 
collection of taxes until the end of an individual’s life, it seems significantly more likely that there 
would be no money left to pay the bills accumulated over that lifetime. 
 77 G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 68 (1995). 
 78 Of course, redistribution could be consistent with a libertarian model, as long as the redis-
tribution was explicitly consented to by the taxpayers involved. Here one might imagine Warren 
Buffett, Bill Gates, and others insisting that they should be taxed more heavily in order for the 
government to have more funds available to support social welfare programs. ‘Patriotic Million-
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damental libertarian objection to the estate tax. As a logistical matter, liber-
tarian-sanctioned benefit principle taxation is likely easiest to administer 
through the income tax. An estate tax is permissible on libertarian grounds 
as long as the justification for the tax is limited to benefit principle grounds. 
The Nozickian view of absolute property rights objects to taxation intended 
to redistribute when that redistribution has not been explicitly consented to. 
The form of the taxation (whether the tax is assessed as an income tax or as 
an estate tax) does not affect the analysis. 
C. Utilitarianism 
Stemming from the nineteenth-century writings of John Stuart Mill, 
utilitarianism evaluates the morality of actions on the basis of the utility 
produced by those actions.79 The ethically correct action is that which max-
imizes utility the most overall, including in the utility calculus both the pro-
duction of utility and the off-setting production of disutility.80 Utilitarianism 
has generally evolved into contemporary theories of welfare economics. In 
this model, the utilitarian calculus is done by determining the utility of par-
ticular outcomes based on the social preferences of the relevant society. Ac-
tions are not a priori moral or immoral. On the contrary, the rightness or 
wrongness of an action can only be determined by examining its conse-
quences. In this sense, utilitarianism is deeply contextual, and utilitarian 
analyses would likely result in different moral outcomes in different social 
scenarios. In evaluating tax policies from a utilitarian theoretical perspec-
tive, one must determine what outcomes each policy will likely have. Here 
empirical economic research plays an important role, making predictions 
about the likely economic consequences of various tax policy actions. Clas-
sical utilitarianism, however, as articulated by Mill, included objective utili-
ty values.81 
At the center of Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, and the element that 
makes utilitarianism more than merely an ethics of self-interest, is that, 
when one calculates how any particular action will maximize happiness, 
one must not privilege one’s own happiness over that of any other person.82 
All human beings have equal value when calculating how much happiness 
                                                                                                                           
aires’ Lobby Congress for Higher Taxes on Rich, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec11-millionaires_11-16/ [https://perma.cc/BE7V-JB3B]. 
 79 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., 1998). 
 80 See id. at 54–72 (explaining the meaning of utilitarianism). 
 81 See id. 
 82 Id. at 105 (“[Impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-
Happiness Principle. That principles is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless 
one person’s happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is 
counted for exactly as much as another’s.”). 
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there is in the world.83 Therefore, even an action that threatens to impose 
pain on one individual or on a group of individuals might still be held to be 
ethical on a utilitarian calculus, as long as the totality of pleasure created by 
the action exceeds that pain.84 It is this universal nature of the utilitarian 
calculus that makes taxation ethically possible, because the “pain” imposed 
by the government collecting the tax will be offset by the pleasure created 
by the services the government provides with the revenue.85 
Mill’s emphasis that there are higher and lower pleasures, and that the 
higher pleasures are more ethically valuable than the lower ones, serves as 
the basis for thinking that Mill is concerned with more than just self-
interest.86 Mill goes on to explain that, for example, “justice” is nothing 
more than a higher pleasure that must be included in the utilitarian calcu-
lus.87 Justice is a term used regularly in most discussions of ethics. But Mill 
argues that justice has no meaning outside of the utilitarian calculus.88 Valu-
ing “justice,” even giving it absolute dominance over all other values, only 
demonstrates that what we call “justice” must be given great worth in the 
utilitarian calculus. Justice is nothing but a surfeit of pleasure produced by 
certain actions. Part of what often gets left out of discussions of the utilitari-
an calculus is Mill’s belief that if people are, in fact, highly moral, then they 
will get pleasure from helping others.89 A world that is just, by utilitarian 
measures, will tend towards equality, as those with means will experience 
happiness by sharing what they have with those who have less.90 
Mill ultimately holds that there are meaningful differences between the 
higher and lower pleasures, and that the higher pleasures are those that tend 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 64 (“[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, 
is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that 
of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent 
spectator.”). 
 84 See id. 
 85 Mill discusses taxation towards the end of Utilitarianism, primarily by criticizing non-
consequentialist analyses of the justice of taxation. See id. at 102. Mill claims that the only way 
out of the debate about the appropriate way to tax is to apply utilitarian principles. Id. Having 
pointed out that some theories of justice will demand equal taxation from all, and others will re-
quire graduated tax, Mill states: “From these confusions there is no other mode of extrication than 
the utilitarian.” Id. 
 86 See id. at 78–79, 102–104 (discussing equality and impartiality). 
 87 See id. at 87–95 (describing what is just and unjust). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 5 (“[I]n a properly constituted world, the individual’s happiness will be found in 
doing what is morally right.”). 
 90 See id. at 63–64 (“The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of 
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice 
itself is a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happi-
ness, it considers wasted.”). 
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toward equality and justice.91 And because motives are irrelevant, from an 
ethical perspective, laws can and should create ethical behavior by mandat-
ing happiness-producing actions. 
V. HOW SHOULD A SYSTEM OF WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION BE 
DESIGNED? 
If the goal of wealth transfer taxation is the dilution of concentrations 
of wealth and the minimization of dynastic wealth, then our current system 
is not necessarily the best approach. The U.S. federal gift and estate tax sys-
tem imposes a tax on the wealth held by the taxpayer at death, or transferred 
by the taxpayer during his or her lifetime.92 That wealth is taxed in the same 
way, regardless of the identity of the recipient of the transfer,93 and regard-
less of the amount transferred to any one particular recipient.94 Another 
model of tax system design focuses on the recipient of the transfer, taxing at 
the site of receipt, rather than the site of distribution. Many states in the 
United States have an inheritance tax designed like this, most of which also 
exempt transfers made to surviving spouses or direct descendants of the 
transferor, although such an exemption is not an essential part of the tax.95 
Focusing on the economic status of the recipient of the transfer, rather than 
on the status of the transferor, allows this form of wealth transfer taxation, 
often referred to as an inheritance tax,96 to more directly combat the ine-
qualities that most vex proponents of wealth transfer taxation. 
If the primary concern of the problem of inequality is increasing con-
centration of wealth in the hands of some at the expense of the well-being 
of other members of society, an inheritance tax that specifically targets the 
transfer of large amounts of wealth to one particular individual would best 
address that problem. The proper focus of the tax should be the recipient, 
rather than the transferor. An inheritance tax, focused on the recipient of 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. at 87–105 (explaining the connection between utility and justice). 
 92 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.  
 93 The exception to this rule is transfers to surviving spouses, which are entirely exempt from 
tax. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2012). 
 94 This excepts the annual exclusion amount described earlier. See supra notes 12–13 and 
accompanying text (explaining the exclusions under I.R.C. § 2503 (2012)). 
 95 See Scott Drenkard & Richard Borean, Does Your State Have an Estate or Inheritance 
Tax?, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/does-your-state-have-estate-or-
inheritance-tax [https://perma.cc/42V5-3WEB]. For example, Kentucky has an inheritance tax but 
grants a total exemption to surviving spouses. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.080(a) (West 2010). 
 96 This Article uses the term “inheritance tax” throughout to refer to a tax that is imposed on 
the recipient of the transfer, rather than on the transferor, as an estate tax is structured. This is not 
the universal vocabulary, however, because the United Kingdom’s wealth transfer tax is referred 
to as an “inheritance tax,” although the structure of the tax is quite similar to what we call the 
“estate tax” within the U.S. wealth transfer tax system. See Inheritance Tax, GOV.UK, https://
www.gov.uk/inheritance-tax [https://perma.cc/PP3Z-FWTV]. 
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gifts or bequests at death, could offer a per-recipient exemption amount, 
taxing all transfers over a lifetime that exceeded that basic amount. By fo-
cusing on the recipient of a transfer, rather than the transferor, an inher-
itance tax would encourage the breaking up of concentrations of wealth. 
Rather than facing the same tax bill, regardless of whether the transferor 
transfers the entirety of his or her estate to a single heir or multiple heirs, 
this inheritance tax could allow the potential transferor to significantly re-
duce the overall tax bill. Distributing the wealth more broadly would allow 
the transferor to gift more of his or her estate to intended recipients, rather 
than having that amount collected by the government in the form of a tax. 
Of course, many transferors’ decisions will be unaffected by the structure of 
the wealth transfer tax as either an estate tax or an inheritance tax. For these 
taxpayers, there may be only one or two potential heirs to receive the 
wealth, and it may be the desire of the transferor to pass the wealth to those 
heirs, regardless of the size of the tax bill. Even in those cases, however, an 
inheritance tax may bring the economic situation more in line with the goals 
of wealth transfer tax proponents. Because the tax would be levied more 
heavily on transfers made entirely to one heir, there would be less wealth 
remaining after the tax to be transferred to the hands of that heir. In that 
sense, the concentration of wealth would be broken up, at least in part.  
Whether this form of the tax would be more effective at breaking up 
the concentrations of wealth for transfers to a sole heir, despite the higher 
tax than would be assessed on a transfer to several heirs, would depend on 
the rates imposed. If the rates were high enough (for instance a tax of one 
hundred percent on all transfers over a fixed exemption amount), then it is 
likely the potential transferors would find additional heirs to whom they 
would transfer at least some of their wealth. Alternatively, if charitable con-
tributions remained deductible, as they are currently, then a large portion of 
the transferred wealth would likely be donated to charity. 
CONCLUSION 
The estate and gift tax system in the United States is a battered soldier, 
having withstood one hundred years of attacks and amendments. Constantly 
threatened with extinction, our wealth transfer taxes still play a critically 
important role in the preservation of progressivity in our nation’s tax sys-
tem. Indeed, as more and more empirical research and economic theory 
demonstrates, economic inequality in the United States is at historic levels. 
A robust system of wealth transfer taxation is best suited to combat that in-
equality in the twenty-first century. Further, as this Article demonstrates, 
wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most philosophical belief sys-
tems. Alternate forms of wealth transfer taxation, in particular a system fo-
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cused primarily on the recipients of wealth, rather than its transferors, may 
better comport with most common philosophical beliefs. In order to see the 
way that wealth transfer taxation fits within these philosophical frame-
works, though, it is often necessary to consider them in a larger context, as 
part of a system that tends toward desirable philosophical aims, rather than 
as individual elements of the law. This Article attempts to contribute to that 
project, thereby shoring up the U.S. wealth transfer tax system for its next 
hundred years. 
   
 
